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he purpose of a cap-and-trade system is to help in the fight against global climate change. This 
paper warns that a unilateral approach could increase global emissions by shifting production 
to more carbon-intensive methods abroad. Acting alone, the EU’s Emission Trading Scheme 
may be doing more harm than good. 
The purpose of a cap-and-trade system is to help in the fight against global climate change by putting a 
cap on domestic emissions. It is clear that a binding cap on emissions will restrict the supply of all 
energy-intensive goods. This implies that the global price of these goods must increase, and therefore 
production abroad will increase, which will lead to higher emissions abroad. A carbon tax will have the 
same effect, which is called ‘carbon leakage’ in the parlance of the climate change community. 
Most analysis of carbon leakage focuses on a small subset of energy-intensive sectors (steel, cement, 
etc.) whose products are often traded intensively. The EU has actually defined sectors exposed to a 
significant risk of carbon leakage mainly in terms of their openness to trade and found that about 60% of 
all Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) sectors (accounting for about 75% of emissions) are ‘at risk’ (see 
Appendix). 
A recent study based on a large general-equilibrium model concludes that about 40% of any reduction in 
the production of energy-intensive goods in the EU would be offset by higher production abroad 
(Veenendaal & Manders, 2008).
1 
A cap-and-trade paradox 
In recent work, I argue that this focus in much of the literature on energy-intensive industries is 
misguided because it focuses on the wrong issue (competitiveness of particular sectors) and neglects the 
fact that the output of these industries (especially energy and steel) is used throughout the economy 
(Gros, 2009a). Most products that are traded intensively incorporate thus substantial amounts of 
                                                      
1 This study arrives, however, at much lower estimates for overall carbon leakage for reasons that are not clear. See 
also Renaud (2008). For a different point of view, see Gurria (2009). 
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emissions via the energy and energy-intensive inputs used in their production. Given that it is usually 
assumed that the supply of exports from China and other emerging market economies is rather price 
elastic, even small changes in relative prices could have a considerable impact on trade flows. 
It is well known that carbon leakage undermines the effectiveness of any national cap- and-trade system 
in reducing global emissions. But it is not widely realised that, under certain conditions, carbon leakage 
could paradoxically cause the imposition of a cap-and trade–system like the Emissions Trading Scheme 
to increase global emissions and thus reduce (global) welfare. 
The mechanism through which this can happen becomes clear once one distinguishes between 
production and carbon leakage. 
•  ‘Production’ describes the displacement, at least partially, of domestic production to the rest of the 
world. 
•  ‘Leakage’ refers to the amount of emissions avoided when domestic production falls relative to the 
increase of emissions in the rest of the world where production goes up. 
For example, if production leakage were only 50% (i.e. foreign production increases only by one half of 
the fall in domestic production), global emissions would still increase if the carbon intensity abroad is 
more than twice as high as at home. The general point is that the displacement of production, even if 
partial, can lead to an increase in overall emissions if the carbon intensity of production in the rest of the 
world is much higher than at home. 
Differences in carbon intensity 
A key parameter in any judgement of the efficiency of the Emissions Trading Scheme (and the national 
carbon taxes in France and Sweden) is thus the difference in carbon intensity between the EU and its 
major trading partners. How large is it? 
Estimates of the emissions embodied in international trade have to be based on input-output matrices in 
order to taken into account the way energy inputs are used throughout the economy. On this basis Weber 
et al. (2008) suggest that (on average for all sectors) each $1,000 of exports from China contains about 2-
3 tonnes of carbon, about 4 times more than the 0.5 tonnes of carbon embodied in $1,000 of exports from 
the EU or other OECD countries. The same sources also show that exports from other emerging markets 
have sometimes even higher carbon intensities than those of China. 
Another way to provide a crude estimate of differences in carbon intensities is the carbon intensity of 
GDP, which is ten times higher in Russia than in the EU and six times higher in China (see Table 1). Of 
course, the higher carbon intensities of emerging markets are partially due to their different output mix. 
However, this does not change the basic fact that a dollar unit increase in exports from China in general 
embodies four times as much CO2 emissions than a dollar of exports from the EU or the US. Moreover, 
higher exports in general lead to higher income, and higher GDP growth in China is associated with a 
very higher growth rate of emissions. 
Table 1. Countries’ carbon intensities 
   CO2 intensity of exports  CO2 intensity of GDP 2005 
EU27 0.47  0.43 
US 0.72  0.53 
China 2.46  2.43 
India 2.67  1.78 
Brazil 1.05  0.5 
Russia 3.85  4.4 
Source: Author’s calculations based on IFM data and Weber et al. (2008).  
Carbon intensity of exports is based on 2002 data. Both intensities 
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If one accepts as a benchmark that Chinese production is in general about 4 to 5 times as carbon-
intensive as that of the EU, it follows that the Emissions Trading Scheme might have led to an increase in 
global emissions if production leakage had been only somewhat above 20-25%.
2 
A proper welfare evaluation of the economic impact of a cap-and-trade system like the Emissions 
Trading Scheme (or of the more wide-ranging recent French proposal to tax all energy inputs, not only in 
the energy-intensive (Emission Trading Scheme) sectors) should take into account also the fact that the 
displacement of consumption and production leads to standard welfare effects (producer and consumer 
surpluses). Figure 1 shows the equilibrium conditions for a (possibly composite) good whose production 
creates emissions and thus an externality. 
Figure1. Effect of the Emissions Trading Scheme with higher carbon intensity abroad 
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The introduction of a domestic carbon price (via a ‘cap and trade’ system or otherwise) has two effects: 
•  It reduces global production, from QFTno ETS to QFTETS. 
This reduction in global production increases welfare because at the margin the social cost was higher 
than the (private=social) benefits from consumption. The net welfare gain is given by the area (covered 
by little rectangles) enclosed by the points OADE (loss of consumer surplus under the line OE but gain 
of social cost of production below the line DG). 
•  The fact that the domestic price of carbon is higher than the price for carbon abroad leads to an 
increase in the social cost of production beyond the point at which the domestic “cap” or ceiling is 
reached. 
From this point onwards, the social cost is not only above the one for the unconstrained case (i.e. the case 
without a domestic cap on emissions) but also steeper because any additional production has to take 
place abroad. This increases the social cost for two reasons: first, the private cost of production is higher 
because the supply from domestic producers cannot increase. Secondly, the external effects from 
producing abroad are higher because the carbon intensity abroad is higher. This implies that the (global) 
social cost of producing the reduced quantity QFTETS is higher by the shaded trapezoid enclosed by the 
points BCDG. 
                                                      
2 It is of course impossible to determine the marginal carbon intensity for exports from emerging economies that are 
related to the imposition of the Emissions Trading Scheme in Europe. However, the burden of proof should be on 
those who argue that this marginal carbon intensity is much lower than the average measured by aggregate 
statistics. 4 | Daniel Gros 
As drawn, it is clear that an ETS-like cap-and-trade system can actually make the world worse off. 
Whether or not this is the case depends of course on the slopes of the demand and supply functions 
relative to the difference between domestic and foreign carbon intensities. 
Gros (2009a) shows in the context of a standard fully specified model that a domestic price on carbon 
can be counterproductive in terms of global welfare under the following condition: 
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This condition is more likely to be satisfied the lower the sum of the domestic and foreign elasticities of 
demand and the higher the foreign elasticity of supply, adjusted for the size of the foreign country. In 
other words, the introduction of a cap-and-trade system in a small country that is much less carbon-
intensive than the rest of the world has a high probability of being counterproductive. Moreover, the 
longer the time horizon, the higher should be the elasticity of supply. This implies that while carbon 
leakage might not be important in the short run, it could become much more relevant as time goes on. 
This analysis would of course be relevant, mutatis mutandis, also for the general carbon tax recently 
proposed in France. Given that France is small relative to the rest of the world and that the carbon 
intensity of the French economy is rather low, this measure could thus very well have a negative impact 
on global welfare. Adopting a domestic carbon tax at the EU level would not change the conclusion 
much since the EU accounts also for only a limited share of global GDP. 
Conclusion 
Given that the developing world has now openly declared that it is not willing to accept any binding cap 
on its own emissions at the Copenhagen summit, it is time to rethink the European approach to 
combating climate change. The unilateral approach followed so far might do more harm than good.
3  
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Appendix 
Article 10a of the revised Directive states that a sector or sub-sector is “deemed to be exposed to a 
significant risk of carbon leakage if: 
•  the extent to which the sum of direct and indirect additional costs induced by the implementation of 
this directive would lead to a substantial increase of production cost, calculated as a proportion of the 
Gross Value Added, of at least 5%; and 
•  the Non-EU Trade intensity defined as the ratio between total of value of exports to non EU + value 
of imports from non-EU and the total market size for the Community (annual turnover plus total 
imports) is above 10%.” A sector or sub-sector is also deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of 
carbon leakage: 
•  if the sum of direct and indirect additional costs induced by the implementation of this directive 
would lead to a particularly high increase of production cost, calculated as a proportion of the Gross 
Value Added, of at least 30%; or 
•  if the Non-EU Trade intensity defined as the ratio between total of value of exports to non EU + 
value of imports from non-EU and the total market size for the Community (annual turnover plus 
total imports) is above 30%. See: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/carbon_en.htm 
which concludes: 151 of 258 NACE-4 sectors (≈ 60% of all sectors) deemed at Significant Risk of 
CL (SRCL). Sectors deemed exposed to SRCL account for ≈ 75% of GHG emissions of industries 
covered by ETS. 